A scholarly article on TTP
Narratives on the TTP
Asad Munir
Saturday, July 06, 2013
From Print Edition
Nawaz Sharif wants to talk to the Taliban. Imran Khan has, for many years, considered negotiations to be the only option to get rid of terrorism and is convinced that Waliur Rehman was a pro-Pakistan militant, who was only droned because the US wants to sabotage the process of negotiations with the TTP.
Two APCs, attended by all political parties, also preferred the option of negotiations over the use of force. So the majority of Pakistanis want to negotiate with the terrorists. In a democratic state we must honour the opinion of the majority and go for the option of dialogue.
An offer of talks was initiated by the TTP through a Punjabi Taliban leader Asmatullah Muawiya in late 2012, laying down three conditions, ?The government should make independent foreign policy, withdraw from the Afghan war, and form and implement a new Islamic constitution in the country?. The offer was later endorsed by the TTP, naming three politicians ? Nawaz Sharif, Fazlur Rehman and Munawar Hasan ? to act as guarantors for the implementation of any agreement that was finalised through the negotiations.
This offer was withdrawn once Waliur Rehman was killed in a drone strike. Since the TTP is so sure that the nation is in favour of talks, it has conditionally renewed the offer ?if the group sees that the elected government is able to take a stand against the country?s intelligence agencies, only then will the option of talks be considered?.
Before opting for talks, the Taliabanisation of Pakistan needs to be understood in its correct perspective. This process did not start with the US war on terror, as believed by the majority of Pakistanis.
In 1994 the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) initiated an armed movement for enforcement of shariah in the Malakand Division. The group took control of some districts through the use of force. It took the troops of Frontier Corps more than a month to dislodge the TNSM from the areas it had captured. Nizam-e-Adl was introduced and established in Malakand in 1995 ? later revised in 1998.
However, the issue was not completely resolved and TNSM activists continued with their protests till 2001. Leaders of the TNSM enforced Taliban?s rule in Swat and Bajaur, led by Fazlullah ? son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad ? and Faqir Mohammad respectively. In 1996 the Afghan Taliban captured Kabul. Inspired by their achievements, a Taliban force was raised in the Orakzai Agency in 1997. In 1998 a Taliban force emerged in Mirali, North Waziristan.
A few tribals from South Waziristan had joined the Afghan Taliban and taken part in battles against the Northern Alliance. By the year 2000 Talibanisation had spread to Fata and some districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Once Afghanistan was invaded, the Pakistani Taliban were already active in some parts of Fata. They provided the required support system to the foreign militants who fled Afghanistan and took refuge in Pakistan.
The army was inducted into Waziristan in 2001/2002 with two objectives ? to develop infrastructure in the inaccessible areas of Waziristan and to conduct targeted operations against foreign militants who had entered Waziristan in large numbers in March 2002. The narrative that there was no terrorism before 2004 and it started because the army entered Fata is not based on facts. The army entered Fata because there were a large number of Al-Qaeda terrorists in Waziristan. These militants had plans to create a state with Fata and some border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa included in it.
The other popular narrative believed by Pakistanis is that the issue of terrorism cannot be addressed by the use of force as we have failed to eliminate terrorism in the last eleven years. The fact is that in 2008-2009 there were eighteen administrative units, districts, tribal agencies and frontier regions that were either completely or partially under the influence of the TTP. Now they have their bases only in North Waziristan. They have been dislodged from all other areas through the use of force; they refuse to surrender through negotiations.
Very few people know that negotiations with the tribals were initiated in 2002, before the start of any operations ? and the process of dialogue continued all through these eleven years. Numerous peace deals were inked, but none produced the desired results. All such deals were used by the Taliban to their advantage; they regrouped, increased their strength, trained their fighters, explored avenues of funding and extended their influence from two tribal agencies to the whole of Fata and Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Negotiations are likely to be a complicated process, which will require many issues to be addressed as well as a framework accepted by both parties. Since the offer has been made by Hakeemullah Mehsud, talks will be held with his group. There are many other groups of the TTP like those of Fazlullah of Malakand, Faqir Mohammad of Bajaur, and Khalid Umer of the Mohmand Agency. Some of these militants are presently based in Kunar and the Nuristan province of Afghanistan.
Are they still part of Hakeemullah Mehsud?s TTP? Will they accept any agreement reached between the state and the TTP led by Hakeemullah Mehsud? In all probability they will not.
What about Mangal Bagh and other groups operating in the Khyber Agency? What will be the fate of Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants presently operating from North Waziristan? Will they surrender and agree to be handed over to their countries of origin or decide to live as peaceful refugees in Pakistan? What about the LeJ and other groups operating in Waziristan?
Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir?s groups are presently not conducting terrorist activities inside Pakistan ? will they disband their forces once the US leaves Afghanistan? In all probability they will not; they will either join the Afghan Taliban in their battle for the capture of Kabul. If that does not happen they will keep their forces, control Waziristan and try to expand their influence to other parts of Fata, like the TTP did .
The PML-N should go ahead with the negotiations ?option?, but in all probability it may not achieve the desired results, and may not bring peace and end terrorism in this unfortunate country.
The TTP is likely to make unconstitutional and unreasonable demands. But the only advantage of such talks, in my opinion, is that it may help in building a national consensus that the use of force is the only language terrorists like the TTP understand.
The writer is a retired brigadier. Email: [email?protected]
Narratives on the TTP - Asad Munir
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